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INTERRELIGIOUS FRIENDSHIP: 
A NEW THEOLOGICAL VIRTUE* 
James L. Fredericks 
PRECIS 
Today, in an effort to respond to their religiously pluralistic situation, Christians should 
recognize friendships with non-Christians as a theological virtue. The first section of this essay 
reviews some of the recent discussion of virtue theory, noting that virtues are enduring aspects 
of character that incorporate values and skills, have histories, and often act as correctives to 
vices. The second section reflects on friendship as a virtue, using Aristotle, Sartre, and Lévinas, 
among others. The third section discusses interreligious friendship in particular as an example 
of a human excellence, a new virtue that incorporates values and skills and helps Christians in 
resisting the vice of despising, ignoring, or caricaturing their non-Christian religious neighbors. 
A final section has to do with the limitations of interreligious friendship as a new theological 
virtue. 
Given the intrusive fact of religious diversity today, Christian believers 
not only need to account for diversity theologically, but they also need to 
address this diversity creatively and responsibly in their own lives. In doing so, 
Christians will need to cultivate within themselves personal qualities that in 
the past have not been recognized as valuable and, in fact, may even have been 
seen as vices. Recent work in the area of virtue theory may prove helpful in 
addressing this challenge. Virtue theory provides a language for talking about 
what is of vital importance in our lives. It is especially useful for discerning the 
role that character plays in equipping us to deal with life's challenges and 
promoting human flourishing. 
The focus of this essay is not virtue theory as such. It will, instead, seek to 
reflect on a topic that has received scant, if any, attention: the role of virtues 
*The author thanks numerous friends for their insightful suggestions in the preparation of 
this essay, including Denise Carmody, Jack Renard, Louke van Wensveen, Mark Unno, Paul 
Knitter, Msgr. Royale Vadikan, Paul Griffiths, Robert Schreiter, Lee Yearley, and Dorothy 
Bertucci. 
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in helping us to live creatively and responsibly with people whose religious 
view of the world is significantly different from our own. Neither will this essay 
address the important problem of comparative approaches to the virtues.1 
Instead, it will draw attention to our need to identify and cultivate virtues that 
equip us for living well in a world where people of differing religious outlooks 
increasingly find themselves neighbors. 
More specifically, the essay inquires into virtues that can be especially 
beneficial to Christian believers in an environment of religious pluralism. 
Instead of offering a new interpretation of an existing virtue (such as tolerance, 
whose value in regard to religious diversity has already been recognized), I 
want to identify what I believe to be a new virtue: interreligious friendship. 
Friendships that reach across the boundaries of doctrine, experience, and 
value that separate religions should rightly be recognized as virtuous for 
Christian believers today. Those who follow religious paths other than my own 
may, in fact, agree with me that interreligious friendships should be extolled 
as virtuous. However, these religious believers may have very different ways 
of thinking about virtues and about friendship. Conversely, non-Christians 
may decide that friendships with believers other than their co-religionists are 
not virtuous at all. 
L Virtues 
Over approximately the past fifteen years, ethics and moral theology have 
undergone a renaissance driven by the rediscovery of the centrality of an ethics 
of virtue as distinct from the quandary ethics that has been the legacy of the 
European Enlightenment.2 Quandary ethics is concerned with justifying acts 
either by rules or by consequences, while generally remaining unconcerned 
with the character of the moral agent and the nature of human happiness. The 
Roman Catholic manualists shared in this modern eclipse of the virtues by 
departing from the legacy of Aristotle and Aquinas and treating virtues as 
sources of obligations rather than resources for living well. The return to virtue 
ethics has shifted attention from rules, consequences, duties, and obligations 
to a concern for the cultivation of human character as it contributes to the 
flourishing of human life.3 
*For significant contributions to the problem of comparative virtues, see John Stratton 
Hawley, ed., Saints and Virtues (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987); Robin W. 
Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, eds., Cosmogony and Ethical Order: New Studies in Comparative 
Ethics (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985); and Lee H. Yearley, Mencius 
and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1990). 
2For some of the more important contributions to the rediscovery of the virtues in relation 
to ethics, see the extensive bibliographies in Lee H. Yearley, "Recent Work on Virtue," Religious 
Studies Review 16 (January, 1990): 1-9; and William C. Spohn, "The Return of Virtue Ethics," 
Theological Studies 53 (March, 1992): 60-75. 
3Of course not all ethicists have welcomed the return to virtue ethics. For a prominent 
defender of a deontological ethics in the Kantian tradition, see Ronald Michael Green, Religion 
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Most figures who are prominent in the discussion of virtue theory would 
agree with Lee Yearley's definition of a virtue as "a disposition to act, desire, 
and feel that involves the exercise of judgment and leads to a recognizable 
human excellence, an instance of human flourishing."4 In keeping with this 
definition, a virtue should be thought of as a "recognizable human excellence." 
Any inquiry into the nature and import of the virtues necessarily leads us into 
the arena of human character and its contribution to the realization of what 
is of value in life. Therefore, virtues should not be confused with emotional 
states that pass away quickly. The virtues are enduring elements of what 
constitutes us as specific individuals. Beyond these brief statements, I would 
like to underscore three other important aspects of the virtues. 
First, virtues incorporate values and skills. Virtues involve values to the 
extent that they make possible prudent judgments about what constitutes a 
lasting good. In this respect, virtues generally imply qualities that are publicly 
extolled and recognized as important for the common good. In acting virtuous-
ly, we embody values and contribute to human flourishing. This suggests a 
connection between virtues as the embodiment of values and the skills re-
quired to realize these values. Virtues also involve skills that require training 
and discipline. To the extent that they involve skills, virtues must be cultivated; 
they are not simply innate. A person skillful in realizing a value in life can also 
be said to embody a virtue. Since capabilities are not evenly distributed among 
human beings, some will excel in a particular virtue, while others will be 
deficient. A virtue arises in the confluence of values and skills. For example, 
a wine-maker may be skilled but is not thereby made virtuous. Similarly, one 
may recognize justice as a value but still lack the skills required to realize that 
value concretely. Persons such as these are not virtuous either, but a person 
with good organizational skills who sees a value in helping others with these 
skills may be said to be virtuous. 
Second, virtues have histories. Some virtues are old. Other virtues are 
relatively new to any given community. Perhaps the notion of a "new" virtue 
needs some defense. Most of the virtues that come readily to mind would seem 
to be not only universal but also perennial: courage, honesty, patience, gener-
osity. Moreover, to the extent that virtues tend to be publicly admired quali-
ties, a "new" virtue will probably not be widely admired and may even be 
considered a vice. Therefore, my claim about interreligious friendship as a new 
virtue must be taken prescriptively. Some virtues merit wider recognition 
because our circumstances have changed to the point that these qualities are 
more salutary today than they were in the past.5 For this reason, some virtues 
and Moral Reason: A New Method for Comparative Study (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988); idem, Religious Reason: The Rational and MoralBasis of Religious Belief{NewYork: Oxford 
University Press, 1978); and idem, Kierkegaard and fiant: the Hidden Debt (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1992). j 
4Yearley, "Recent Work," p. 2. For a discussion of various definitions of virtue, see Edmund 
L. Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues: Against Reductivism in Ethics (Lawrence, KS: University Press 
of Kansas, 1986), pp. 73-100. 
5For a discussion of virtues and their histories, see Lee H. Yearley, "New Religious Virtues 
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may be understood as era-specific. This is true in two distinct but related ways. 
First, what is considered a human excellence in one age may be deemed a vice 
(or perhaps at the least a curiosity or eccentricity) in another. For example, 
early Christians prized the virtue of faith, manifested in the form of world-
renunciation, a virtue quite unintelligible to Cicero who lived a generation 
before. Second, the character of a specific virtue can change significantly over 
time. For example, for Homer, courage had to do with bravery in battle; for 
Gandhi, courage was manifested in the practice of nonviolence. Virtues have 
histories because they are recognized and cultivated in response to ever-chang-
ing historical situations. Thus, the confluence of skills and values recognized 
by an individual or community as a virtue must of necessity change in response 
to the bumpy road of history. 
Third, virtues can function as correctives.6 In responding to human weak-
nesses or need, virtues often address some propensity within us that needs to 
be resisted. In this fashion, virtues may be coupled with vices. For example, 
patience acts as a corrective to the human tendency to be impulsive. In some 
cases, virtues can be coupled with two vices. Aristotle argued that virtues often 
form the mean between extremes. If in media stat virtus, then vices are to be 
found on both extremes. For example, the virtue of courage forms the mean 
between the vices of cowardice and brashness.7 
To return to my basic claim, Christian believers would do well to cultivate 
what I take to be a new virtue: friendship with people who follow religious 
paths other than their own. My proposal is not modest. By no means do I expect 
that all will agree that interreligious friendship is a desirable quality in a 
Christian or that it will lead to the flourishing of the Christian tradition. In 
fact, some will see it as a vice rightly to be avoided. In defense of my claim, I 
would like to offer some ideas about the virtue of friendship in general before 
turning to interreligious friendship in particular. 
IL Befriending the Stranger 
Any inquiry into friendship must, perforce, be an inquiry into the relation-
al character of our lives. Friendship, as a theme within feminist thought, for 
example, has been an effective way of calling into question the European 
and the Study of Religion," the 15th Annual University Lecture in Religion given at Arizona State 
University on February 10,1994, pp. 6-10,14. See also Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study 
in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981; 2nd ed., 1984); and 
Dietmar Mieth and Jacques Marie Pohier, eds., Changing Values and Virtues, Concilium 191 
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1987). 
6See Yearley, "New Religious Virtues," p. 1; and idem, Mencius and Aquinas, pp. 16-17, 
114-116. 
7For a discussion of the virtues in relation to the vices, see Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices 
and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 
8-14; and Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1984). 
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Enlightenment's preoccupation with the autonomous individual.8 Friend-
ships humanize. By means of friendships we are exposed to the formative 
elements of life that complete us, orient us to life-goals, and shape our sense 
of value and worth. Friendship has been an important theme in the recent 
discussion of virtue theory. The concern for friendship is especially visible in 
the various retrievals of Aristotle and Aquinas, both of whom placed heavy 
emphasis on friendship as a virtue that is also a school for other virtues.9 
In the West,10 discussions of friendship have been dominated by the need 
to come to terms with the relationship between two different understandings 
of love:philia and agape. Philia refers to friendship, in the sense of preferential 
love, extolled by Aristotle. Agape is the unconditional love preached by Jesus 
(see, for example, Mt. 5:45). Philia requires a bond of reciprocal affection. 
Agape is steadfast in the face of rejection. Philia reflects the requirements 
placed on friendship by the public life of the Greek polis and its call to civic 
involvement. Agape implies a hope in the redemption from suffering by the 
ultimate triumph of love.11 
In the Western tradition, agape has eclipsed/?/i/ft'fl in prestige, for the most 
part. Over the centuries, for example, Aristotle has been much criticized by 
Christian moralists. Philia was not rejected outright as bad, but it was relegated 
to a subsidiary place below agape, which has been seen as the perfection of 
love. Philia holds up as its end the primacy of self-fulfillment, unlike agape 
with its ethos of self-sacrifice.12 "Aristotle," wrote Simone Weil in her diaries, 
"is the corrupt tree which bears only rotten fruit. How is it that people cannot 
see this?"13 A century earlier, S0ren Kierkegaard argued for the radical oppo-
sition between agape and philia}* Some contemporary commentators, how-
ever, caution against separating agape too starkly fromphilia. Paul Wadell, for 
example, draws our attention away from Kierkegaard and back to Augustine 
T?or a fine example, see Mary E. Hunt, Fierce Tenderness: A Feminist Theology of Friendship 
(New York: Crossroad, 1991). 
9In addition to Maclntyre's After Virtue, see Gilbert Meilaender, Friendship: A Study of 
Theological Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Paul J. Wadell, 
Friendship and the Moral Life (Notre Dame, IN, and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1989); Stanley Hauerwas, "Companions along the Way: The Necessity of Friendship," in Asbury 
Theological Journal 45 (Spring, 1990): 35-48; Jean Porter, Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of 
Aquinas for Christian Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1990), pp. 168-171; and 
Rose Mary Volbrecht, "Friendship: Mutual Apprenticeship in Moral Development," Journal of 
Value Inquiry 24 (October, 1990): 307. 
10Of course, friendship is not a theme monopolized by Western thought. For reflections on 
friendship from non-Western perspectives, see Leroy Rouner, ed., The Changing Face of Friend-
ship (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). Especially helpful for reflection 
on the issue of interreligious friendship are the articles therein by David Burrell ("Friendship with 
God in al-Ghazali and Aquinas"), Bhikhu Parekh ("An Indian View of Friendship"), and David 
L. Hall and Roger Ames ("Confucian Friendship: The Road to Religiousness"). 
nFor a discussion of the problem of the relationship between philia and agape, see Meilaen-
der, Friendship, pp. 2-5. , 
12S0ren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, tr. Howaip V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 58-70. 
13Quoted in Spohn, "Return of Virtue Ethics," p. 62, from Simone Weil, First and Last 
Notebooks (London: Oxford University, 1970), p. 355. 
14Kierkegaard, Works of Love, pp. 58-70. 
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in contending that agape is, in fact, an extension of philia to all, making the 
two not only compatible but also intrinsically connected.15 
The focus of this essay lies more on philia than on agape. My goal is not 
to discern the proper relationship between philia and agape, however impor-
tant this question might be for ethicists. Nor is it interested in the uncondi-
tional love {agape) owed by all Christians to all non-Christians as a basis for 
religious tolerance. My interest lies in how the encounter between religious 
believers today might be both creative and responsible—how religious truths 
manifested in the life of a stranger might come to be welcomed as a transform-
ing truth for a believer from another religious tradition. In fact, what Christian 
moralists have found most lacking in philia is what recommends it most for 
the purposes of this essay: friendship as preferential love arising out of our 
need for self-fulfillment through relatedness.16^4g^ may provide one basis 
for religious tolerance. Philia, I will argue below, provides the basis for another 
type of tolerance and also moves us beyond tolerance to a standpoint wherein 
a transformation of our lives by the Other is possible. 
Even the oldest and very best of friends was once a stranger to us. 
Friendships that are vital do not lose sight of this truth. In fact, friendships 
that would be lasting and rewarding should not seek completely to eradicate 
the stranger within the friend. There is value in showing hospitality to the 
stranger, even the "stranger" who has been a friend for many years. This value 
has at least two aspects: the decentering of the ego, and the expansion of our 
horizons. The stranger helps us to move off our own home ground and, in so 
doing, provides opportunities to understand ourselves in new ways. Often, the 
encounter with those who are strangers to our own ways entails a dethrone-
ment of the ego. Acknowledging worlds other than our own exposes our 
presuppositions and confronts us with our misperceptions. In challenging the 
sovereignty of the ego, the Other helps us to look differently at the world and 
at ourselves. 
Jean-Paul Sartre imagined the encounter with the Other in decidedly 
unfriendly terms. To be in the presence of another person is fundamentally a 
threat, since that Other has the power to call into question the validity of one's 
world.17 Emmanuel Lévinas, like Sartre, also had a good ear for the power of 
the Other to attenuate our self-centeredness. However, in contrast to Sartre's 
emphasis on the shock and threat of the Other, Lévinas emphasized the power 
of the Other to bestow beatitude as well. If the Other is a decentering force in 
our lives, so the Other can be a source of self-knowledge and redemption, as 
well. If the Other is a threat to the integrity of our presuppositions and 
predispositions (what Lévinas called a "traumatism of astonishment"), the 
1 Wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, p. 72. See also Meilaender, Friendship, pp. 6-35. 
Both Meilaender and Wadell underscore the fact that Augustine saw philia as a gift from God that 
naturally finds fulfillment beyond itself in agape. 
16For Aristotle's discussion of our need for friendship, see Aristotle, The Nichomachean 
Ethics, tr. Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs Merrill, 1980), Books VII-X. 
17Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, tr. Hazel 
E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 259-273. 
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Other is also a summons to a more honest and integral life. In the encounter 
with the Other, there is a loss of security but also a loss of hopelessness, the 
ruination of our autonomy but also a liberation from our self-absorption. In 
encountering the Other, we are required to take seriously another center of 
meaning, value, and action; another orientation toward the world; another way 
of being human. In the process, the Other rescues us from the tyranny of the 
autonomous ego. In the Other we have the opportunity to realize that the 
deliverance from our own selfishness does not lie in our own hands. For this 
reason, the terror and the comfort we know before the Other are never 
completely separable. Indifference to the Other or the attempt to render the 
Other harmless by remaking the Other into our own image and likeness is to 
misunderstand the experience fundamentally.18 
A second aspect to the value of showing hospitality to the stranger has to 
do with the expansion of our limited horizons. Lying within every encounter 
with the stranger is a potential for discovery. The Other is present to us, 
Lévinas has written, as a "face" that purveys the familiar and the unfamiliar. 
The stranger has stories to tell that we have never heard before and that may 
not be easily reconciled with our own stories. These new stories are a tremen-
dum and also afascinans, subversive but also enriching. New stories have the 
power to redirect our doing and stimulate our imagining. In this way, the 
strangeness of the stranger itself can become for us a resource for the cultiva-
tion of our souls and the appropriation of truth. 
What can be said of those times when the stranger is not only encountered 
but also befriended? Friendship is a virtue that recognizes the value of the 
stranger and equips us with skills for welcoming her or him. Enduring friend-
ships recognize a value in the Other as such. In befriending the stranger, we 
have not only found a way of taking another human being seriously and 
rejoicing in what we have in common but also a way of holding in regard what 
is different from us, what we have not chosen for ourselves for cherishing and 
living. 
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguished three forms of friend-
ship, each defined by what attracts and binds: friendship based on pleasure, on 
usefulness, and on goodness.19 Neither of the first two types of friendship is 
based on the innate attractiveness of the Other as such. Friendships of 
pleasure and usefulness are based on the enjoyment or benefit that the Other 
can provide. Friendships such as these usually end when the pleasure or the 
usefulness ends.20 In contrast, friendships based on the recognition of good-
18Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, tr. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969). In the area of philosophical hermeneutics, 
there is a great deal of literature on this notion in addition to that of Lévinas. See, e.g., Paul Ricoeur, 
Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, tr. and intro. Erazim V. Kohák (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 126. ι 
19For a useful discussion of Aristotle's ideas on friendship, see John M. Cooper, "Aristotle 
on Friendship," in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, ed.,Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, Major Thinkers Series 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA; London: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 301-340. 
20See Nichomachean Ethics, 1156a5ff. (pp. 218-221). 
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ness in the Other imply that the Other is loved for her or his own sake. 
Friendships such as these are the most lasting.21 Aristotle, however, argues 
that friendships of this type presume that the friends are fundamentally similar 
in character, interests, and outlook. 
In claiming that enduring friendships recognize a value in the Other as 
such, I want to emphasize that the vitality of some forms of friendship arises 
from the attraction we hold for what is different from our customary ways of 
thinking and acting. In this respect, friendships can be ways of embodying 
concretely in our lives the importance of changing our lives well. By drawing 
us out of ourselves and into a world significantly different from our presup-
positions, friends help us to reform our lives and understand ourselves in new 
ways. A friend's actions suggest emulation; a friend's judgments invite reflec-
tion. Our commitment to friendships measures in no small way our commit-
ment to changing our lives well. 
To be threatened by a stranger may be natural to us all. To befriend the 
stranger requires skills. Those who are skillful at befriending have learned how 
to set aside their anxiety and confusion and welcome the new and unfamiliar. 
If friendship provides a context for maintaining an openness to the unforeseen 
and uncontrollable, practicing the virtue of friendship itself helps us to cul-
tivate this openness as a skill. Perhaps this is the case because friendship 
(philia) entails a reciprocal act of hospitality; my willingness to welcome the 
stranger into my world is complemented (and empowered in no small degree) 
by the stranger's willingness to welcome me into hers or his. 
In addition, friendships require us to be playful as conversation part-
ners.22 Playfulness is a practical way to surrender, even if only momentarily, 
the presuppositions that have become established in our lives in order to 
experiment with new possibilities of identity and action. In play we "let 
ourselves go," for a time at least, in order to enter into new modes of 
experience, whether it be the "make-believe" of children or of Ibsen. Good 
conversations have much in common with play. In good conversation, quotid-
ian modes are set aside in order that the conversation partners might enter 
into the play of new ideas, new stories. By losing ourselves within the play of 
the conversation, we establish the possibility of finding ourselves anew. Good 
conversation is rare. Friendships of quality are likely places to look for such 
conversations, a point amply demonstrated by Plato in his Symposium and by 
Louis Malle in his film My Dinner with Andre. Playfulness is a skill particularly 
helpful in assisting us to take the Other seriously on her or his own terms by 
suspending our own presuppositions about ourselves and the world. 
21See ibid., 1156b6-32 (pp. 219-221). 
22On the notion of playfulness in human creativity, see J[ohan] Huizinga, Homo Ludens:A 
Study of the Play-Element in Culture (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1955). For the implications of 
play for the interpretation of texts, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, tr. edited by 
Garrett Bardon and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975); and Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (London: Basil, Blackwell and Mott, 1958), 
pp. 4-20. 
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III. The Virtue of Interreligious Friendship 
To be friendless must be counted a major impoverishment of our human-
ity. In addition ; we may ask how the befriending of one who follows a religious 
path not our own should be counted a virtue. Interreligious friendships are 
human excellencies that contribute to the flourishing of human life. Print and 
electronic media are replete today with news items documenting the violence 
religions can generate. Much less prominently covered are the friendships 
these same religions are capable of generating. 
In the midst of the Cold War, during a conversation with the Buddhist 
scholar Heinrich Dumoulin, S.J., at Sophia University in Tokyo, historian 
Arnold Toynbee predicted that historians in the future would look back on 
the twentieth century and give the conflict between the liberal democracies 
and the Soviet bloc merely a footnote. The initial dialogues between Buddhists 
and Christians would eventually be seen as the events of lasting import. 
Toynbee's statement to Dumoulin is all the more interesting given this priest's 
long-standing personal friendship with Nakamura Hajime, one of the greatest 
interpreters of Buddhism in Japan. On the night of his death, Gustav Weigel, 
S.J., spent a pleasant evening in the parlor of his beloved friend Abraham 
Heschel. The Hasidic rabbi remembered that evening with his friend, report-
ing, "We opened our hearts to one another in prayer and contrition and spoke 
of our own deficiencies, failures, hopes."23 In 1959, Thomas Merton wrote D. 
T. Suzuki, the exponent of Zen Buddhism, what was to become the first of 
many letters. The two actually met five years later at Columbia University. 
Suzuki's friendship would eventually have an impact on Merton, an impact 
that is bearing fruit today in the intermonastic exchanges between Christian 
and Buddhist monks.24 Friendships such as these richly deserve to be held up 
as examples of human excellence to be emulated. They are excellent in that 
they show us a valuable truth for today: We cannot love and remain unchanged. 
Like the virtue of friendship more generically, interreligious friendship 
implies a conjunction of values and skills. One obvious value enshrined in 
friendships that cross religious boundaries is the increase in understanding of 
traditions foreign to our own. Of course, other religious traditions can be 
understood without actually befriending those who have embraced these 
paths. However, in interreligious friendships, religious traditions become 
present to us in the spontaneity of human speech and action and are no longer 
constrained by the limits of the text. The truths of religions cannot be ex-
hausted by inscription.25 Friendships between followers of different traditions 
Abraham Joshua Heschel, "No Religion Is an Island," in Paul J. Griffiths, ed., Christianity 
through Non-Christian Eyes (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Rress, 1990), p. 37. 
^Merton met the present Dalai Lama weeks before his death in 1968. Twenty-eight years 
later, in a major meeting of Buddhist and Christian monks at Merton's monastery in Gethsemani, 
Kentucky, the Dalai Lama draped the cross marking Merton's grave with a Tibetan prayer-shawl, 
saying, "Now our spirits are one; I am at peace." 
*5In addition, some religions must be said to be more textually oriented than others. The 
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help us to resist the tendency to reduce religious forms of life to textuality.26 
In the friend, the religious Other is present not as an abstraction on paper but 
as an embodied truth in all its historical ambiguity. For all their ambiguity, 
texts are but static and limited snapshots of realities even more ambiguous— 
the religions themselves as they are realized in the lives of real believers. 
Interreligious friendships promote understanding between believers in help-
ing them to locate the text not merely within its historical context but also 
within its living, existential context. 
Additionally, friendships that cross over the boundaries between religions 
offer practical ways to embody the value of tolerance. The human need to 
render our enemies faceless in order to hate them has been much studied. The 
virtue of interreligious friendship is a concrete way of resisting this vice. Here 
we may return to my above-stated interest in philia over agape. These two 
forms of love lead to different forms of tolerance. Agape is the unconditional 
love demanded of Christian believers even for their enemies. Philia denotes 
the preferential love of friends, a love that must be reciprocated, for friendship 
is impossible if it is not mutual. We may love an enemy, but we cannot be 
friends with that enemy. 
Religious tolerance based on agape is rooted in a strength borne of a faith 
in an ultimate vindication of love by divine grace. Tolerance such as this 
endures whether or not love is returned and is not dependent on the actual 
character of the Other. Philia provides a basis for religious tolerance of a 
different sort. To the extent that philia denotes a preferential love, tolerance 
rooted in the mutuality of friendship is based on the actual character of the 
Other. If the strength of agape is that tolerance is unconditional, the advantage 
of tolerance rooted in philia is that it is sustained by the concrete appeal the 
Other holds for us. Tolerance based on philia is especially a value in situations 
where one group forms a minority religion within a larger, more established 
religious community. Agape may lead the established believer to look tolerant-
ly on the Other despite her or his errors, as is the case with inclusivist 
theologies of religion.27 Philia leads to toleration based on a recognition of 
the real differences that separate the Other from us. 
Vulnerability to the truth is a third value concretized in interreligious 
friendships. We human beings realize ourselves through fidelity to truths that 
incongruence of a religious form of life with its textual approximations is most obvious in the 
nonliterate religious traditions, but the issue is not dispelled when dealing with religions that 
have created sophisticated texts. Buddhism is not a "religion of the book" in the same way that 
Judaism is. Not all Muslims are oriented to the Qur'an to the same degree. 
26In the act of inscription, there is a withdrawal of the author's speech from the text. On the 
subject of textual "distanciation," see Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the 
Surplus of Meaning (Forth Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press, 1976). The text is 
distanciated not only from the author's speech but also from what remains unsaid in the author's 
speech. 
27The classic example of a Christian inclusivist theology of religion is the theory of the 
"anonymous Christian" advanced by Karl Rahner, SJ. In this view, non-Christians are to be 
tolerated because the same saving grace witnessed to by Christian believers is to be found at work 
in the lives of non-Christians, despite their ignorance of this fact. 
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are not of our own creation and not fully under our control.28 In befriending 
the Other, perhaps most especially the religious Other, truths foreign to my 
own tradition become real possibilities for shaping and giving direction to my 
life. In the process, the truths of a religion not my own can become for me 
theological resources for revising my own religious self-understanding. Show-
ing weakness or admitting confusion is rare in interreligious dialogues, espe-
cially at the official level. Within the embrace of friendship, however, the 
mutual pursuit of truth becomes a more concrete possibility. In short, inter-
religious friendships help us to realize a great value in life: Remaining vul-
nerable to the truth is a responsible act that cannot honestly be pursued 
without the assistance of the Other. 
The value being discerned here is not to be confused with an uncritical 
capitulation to the Other. As noted above, even the oldest and very best of 
friends were once strangers to us. Friendships that are lasting never lose sight 
of the stranger within the friend. Thus, much of the vitality in a friendship lies 
in the honoring of differences, not simply in the enjoyment of similarities.29 
In vital interreligious friendships, there remains a role for apologetics, the 
principled defense of one's religious beliefs. Locating apologetics within the 
context of friendship, however, requires us to account for our faith in the 
presence of a real —not imaginary—Other. For all its inconvenience, having 
to present one's belief to an Other who is also a friend will only sharpen one's 
self-understanding. 
As a virtue, interreligious friendship requires skills as well. If being 
threatened by a stranger is a natural response to the unknown and uncon-
trolled, befriending the stranger requires skills for resisting this tendency. 
Befriending a stranger from a religion other than my own requires special 
skills. Some of these skills are theological. In entering into interreligious 
friendships, Christian believers will be required to interpret their own tradi-
tion in new and resourceful ways. Of course, Christian doctrine has been used 
to dismiss the Other as insignificant or to inoculate Christian believers from 
the threat of the Other. The recent debate over the Christian theology of 
religions bears witness to this.30 Nevertheless, Christian theology, skillfully 
employed, can contribute to the deepening and sustaining of friendships that 
cross religious boundaries. Indeed, interreligious friendships may require 
Christians to revise their theological self-understanding in significant ways. 
^Vadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, p. 15. 
29Aristotle, whose reflections on friendship in the Nichomachean Ethics have been vastly 
influential in the development of Western thinking about the subject, places great stress on 
similarity as the basis for lasting friendships. The historical context of these reflections, however, 
was the political demands of public life imposed by the Greek polis. 
^ o n e of the three basic candidates for a theology of religions (exclusivism, inclusivism, and 
pluralism) is adequate to the task of assisting Christians in addressing the fact of religious diversity 
today. Exclusivism and inclusivism succeed in dismissing or marginalizing the Otherness of 
non-Christians with appeals to the uniqueness of ¿hrist or the universality of grace, apart from 
any concrete familiarity with non-Christians and their religious beliefs. Pluralist theologies, such 
as John Hick's, begin with the "hypothesis" (which in fact is nothing more than a working 
presupposition that can never be abandoned) that all religions share in a common essence. This 
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Recent attempts at a "comparative theology," a theology in which a non-Chris­
tian tradition is looked on as a theological resource for interpreting Christian 
belief, best exemplify the role theological skills can play in interreligious 
friendships.31 
Akin to theological skills is the matter of imagination,32 a skill crucial for 
any friendship. The capacity to imagine skillfully assists one to enter sym­
pathetically into the worldview of the Other.33 In friendships that cross 
religious boundaries, the capacity to imagine may be quite as important as the 
capacity to distinguish concepts and infer from premises. The capacity to use 
the imagination skillfully can be related to yet another skill entailed in the 
virtue of interreligious friendship. Friendships that dare to cross the boun­
daries separating religious traditions require the ability to live well with 
considerable amounts of ambiguity. The capacity to listen patiently and to 
revise one's misconceptions, even after many years of friendship, are skills 
integral to this virtue. 
I have also claimed that interreligious friendship is a new virtue for 
Christians and not sufficiently recognized as yet. Despite the long and shame­
ful history of violence perpetrated in the name of Christian faith, creative 
encounters between Christians and those who follow other religious paths are 
by no means unprecedented. For example, the contribution of Islamic thought 
to Christian theology is well documented. Less well known is the extent to 
which Buddhist and Christian cultures became mutually fecundating in Cen­
tral Asia in the first centuries of the Common Era.34 The notion that friend­
ships of Christians with Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and Jews should be held 
up as virtuous, however, has not generally been the case. 
Today, friendships between Christian believers and believers from other 
religious traditions should be recognized as virtuous because of the historical 
situation in which Christianity presently finds itself. The sheer fact of religious 
diversity, at least in places such as the United States and Western Europe, 
undercuts the plausibility of Christian belief. With the loss of what Peter 
Berger has called our "sacred canopies," we are more self-consciously aware 
assertion renders theologically insignificant the real differences that distinguish other religions 
from Christianity. For a fine synopsis of these three models, see Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name? 
A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes toward the World Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 
1985). Currently the most comprehensive criticism of the the pluralist model of religions is S. Mark 
Heim's Salvations: Truth and Difference in Religion (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1995). 
31For examples of comparative theology, see Francis X. Clooney, Theology after Vedanta 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993); and his more recent Seeing through Texts 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996). Also see Donald W. Mitchell, Spirituality 
and Emptiness (New York and Mahwah, Ν J: Paulist Press, 1991); John Keenan, The Meaning of 
Christ: A Mahayana Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1989); and John B. Cobb, Jr., Beyond 
Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1982). 
32Yearley, "Recent Work," p. 16; idem, Mencius andAquinas, pp. 196-203. 
33For the role of imagination in entering sympathetically into the religious world of another, 
see John S. Dunne, The Way of'All the Earth (New York: Macmillian, 1972). 
34Take, e.g., the argument for a Buddhist origin of the Barlaam and Josaphat legends and 
their influence on the Christian spirituality of the Eastern churches. See David Marshall Lang, 
The Balavariani (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966). 
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today than in the past that the foundations for our deepest religious commit-
ments are not shared by all.35 This state of affairs helps to account for the 
dilemma of fanaticism and relativism that plagues much of intellectual life 
today. The dilemma of fanaticism and relativism compels us to recognize 
interreligious friendship as a virtue for today. 
Interreligious friendship is not only a new virtue, but it also serves as a 
useful corrective to vices that should be resisted. Friendships between fol-
lowers of different religious paths help to correct a natural, but not inevitable, 
human propensity, fear of the Other. Such social scientists as Clifford Geertz 
and such theologians as George Lindbeck are right to emphasize the way in 
which religions offer comprehensive interpretations of the world and human 
life.36 As a result of centuries of doctrinal development, religions can be said 
to be full and complete in themselves—when left to themselves. Today, 
religions no longer live in splendid isolation from each other. For this reason, 
the otherness of another's religion is often experienced as a threat not only to 
the comprehensiveness and coherence of one's own religion but also to its 
plausibility. 
Not surprisingly, religious believers have developed multiple strategies 
for ignoring or controlling or annulling this threat. The religious Other is 
demonized as a terrorist or ridiculed as superstitious or dismissed as a heathen. 
Intellectuals have their own, more academically sophisticated methods. The 
terror and relativizing power of the Other are effectively domesticated and 
defanged with foundationalisms of all sorts, which reduce the Other to what 
David Tracy has called "merely more of the same," whether they are based on 
phenomenological assertions about a universal religious experience or on-
tological assertions about Being Itself or logical assertions about a universal 
rationality. Religious exclusivisms, whether based on theologies of revelation 
(as with Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) or on philosophical anthropologies 
(as with Hinduism and Buddhism), succeed in keeping the Other at bay with 
cultivated neglect.37 
As a corrective to these vices, the virtue of interreligious friendship assists 
Christians in taking their actual experience of other religious believers as the 
prime locus for thinking about the diversity of religions, not the caricatures of 
popular prejudices or the abstract universals of pluralist philosophies, which 
Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1990 [orig. - Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1967]). 
^See Clifford Geertz's essay, "Religion as a Cultural System," in his collection, The Inter-
pretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 87-125. For George A. 
Lind beck, see 77*e Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1984). 
37The critique of foundationalism is reflected in the theology of religions debate. Among the 
most articulate critics of the claim that all religions share in a common essence is Joseph Dinoia, 
whose approach is shaped in large measure by the theology of George Lindbeck and its emphasis 
on religions as discrete, even incommensurate, cultijral-linguistic systems. For the basic pluralist 
position on the "common essence," acting as a foundation uniting all religions, see John Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1989). For Paul F. Knitter's response to the anti-foundationalist critique of the pluralist 
model, see One World, Many Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press, 1996). 
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no actual religious believer would recognize as her or his own. The vice to be 
resisted is not simply our tendency to exclude the religious Other from our 
own account of the world. We must also resist the tendency to begin and end 
our attempts to understand the Other solely in terms of the autonomous self. 
The value of interreligious friendships lies in their ability to help us to move 
the self off its home ground and to expand its limited horizons. 
Moreover, interreligious friendships have the salutary effect of helping us 
to correct the deficiencies and inconsistencies of our own faith. All religious 
worldviews, no matter how highly rationalized, are limited by historical cir-
cumstances and their specific cultural embodiments. The changing social and 
historical circumstances, to which all religious movements are subject, require 
that all religions constantly reinterpret even their most basic symbols and 
doctrines. The incoherence and irrationality of a religion may be detected 
easily by one from outside the tradition, but it is often hard to see from within 
it. Seeing the limits of the stranger's worldview can give us insight into the 
limits of the coherence and rationality of our own. 
In fine, interreligious friendship is a human excellence, a virtue, because 
such friendships embody what Tracy has called "a form of resistance."38 Such 
friendships help us to resist the multiple strategies we have for domesticating 
demanding truths or inoculating ourselves from their transformative power. 
Tracy holds that, in every act of resistance, some unnameable hope begins to 
show itself. In interreligious friendships, this unnameable hope becomes 
discernible in the face of the Other, the friend. 
IV. The Limitations of Friendship 
Interreligious friendship is not the only virtue useful to Christians in 
addressing the fact of religious diversity, nor is this virtue free of dangers. 
Choosing friendship as a model for dealing with religious diversity carries with 
it the possibility of obscuring the real and sometimes painful differences that 
separate religions by overemphasizing the similarities that relate them. Ideal-
ly, friendships foster a sense of community between persons, in that similarity 
can be recognized without loss of separate identity and in that enduring 
differences can be faced as real and yet honored. As stated above, healthy 
friendships do not lose track of the enduring otherness of the friend. 
Not all friendships succeed, however. Interreligious friendships are no 
longer healthy when they are no longer relationships wherein religious differ-
ences are honored and recognized as possible resources for deepening our own 
religious self-understanding. For this reason, perhaps interreligious friend-
ship itself is in need of a corrective. Take, for example, Yearley's notion of 
See David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (San Francisco, 
CA: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 82-114. 
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"spiritual regret."39 He takes spiritual regret as one appropriate response to 
the fact of religious diversity today. This form of regret arises when we 
recognize (1) that there are in fact a plurality of legitimate religious goals, (2) 
that these legitimate goals are in conflict to the degree that no one person can 
embody them all, and (3) that the goals one can in fact pursue are generally 
determined by accidents of birth that are beyond our control. A great value of 
Yearley's focus on our limited ability to embody the wealth of religious truths 
and pursue them as legitimate goals in life is that this limitation acts as a 
corrective to the tendency within interreligious friendships to pass over dif-
ferences in the attempt to recognize similarities. 
In my own case, reflecting on my treasured friendships with Buddhists, I 
am required to acknowledge that I am not, in fact, a Buddhist, even though 
Buddhist truths have had a powerful, salutary, transformative influence on my 
self-understanding as a Christian. I cannot be a Buddhist, not only because my 
roots in the Christian tradition are so deep and so nourishing but also because 
the truths I cherish as a Christian believer are not fully reconcilable with the 
great truths of the Buddhist Dharma. Although I cannot be a Buddhist, I can 
be a friend to those who follow the Eight-fold Path. In these friendships I am 
blessed by truths that are both compelling and different from the truths I 
embrace as a Christian. Thus, in promoting interreligious friendship as a new 
virtue, we must be attentive to the danger of obscuring differences with 
romanticized notions of friendship. 
Is interreligious friendship a universal virtue? Are friendships that cross 
religious boundaries always to be thought of as human excellencies? In the 
recent literature on the virtues, there is widespread agreement that at least 
some virtues are universal.40 At the same time, however, there is also wide-
spread agreement that all virtues are intimately connected with particular 
cultural contexts. Here, I have refrained from claiming that interreligious 
friendship should be recognized as a virtue within non-Christian religious 
traditions, even as I have noted that all friendships, including friendships that 
run across religious traditions, entail reciprocated love. Although I enjoy the 
friendship of several Buddhists, Buddhism as such may not think of inter-
religious friendships as virtuous. 
Nevertheless, I believe Heschel was correct when he noted that, today, "no 
religion is an island."41 Religious diversity is nothing new, but the impact of 
this diversity on believers today makes it incumbent on us to respond to this 
intrusive fact creatively and responsibly. Feminist thinkers have rightly em-
phasized an important truth for today: Relatedness is not an external quality 
affecting the self but is constitutive of our personhood.42 Recognizing that the 
same is true for religions will lead to the flourishing of human life in this 
39Yearley, "New Religious Virtues," pp. 12-16. 
^See, e.g., Yearley, "Recent Work," p. 2; ancTMacIntyre,/i/ter Virtue, pp. 180-196. 
41Heschel, "No Religion Is an Island," pp. 26-40. 
42In addition to Hunt's Fierce Tenderness, see Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychologi-
cal Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Jean 
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religiously pluralistic world. The relatedness of religions, in their similarity 
and in their profound differences, is not accidental to their basic character. 
Today, the relatedness of religions to one another needs to be seen as a 
constitutive quality of all religions. On the one hand, religions are comprehen-
sive interpretations of the world and the meaning of human life. On the other 
hand, modern circumstances make it no longer possible for religions to dwell 
in isolation from one another. Friendships that involve those who follow 
different religious paths are virtuous because they can be creative and respon-
sible realizations of this fact of religious diversity. 
Baker Miller, Toward a New Psychology of Women (Boston, MA* Beacon Press, 1976); and 
Catherine Keller, From a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism, and Self (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 
1986). 
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